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by 
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Abstract 
This paper develops a two-country model of international trade in which citizens who are 
heterogeneous with respect to their factor endowments vote over tariffs and income tax rates. In 
the politico-economic equilibrium, each country chooses its national policies by majority 
voting, taking the policy choice of the other country as given. By incorporating both income 
and trade taxes in a unified international-trade framework, we uncover the interplay between 
majority voting over these two instruments at the domestic level and strategic interdependencies 
between countries’ trade policies. Our main result is that greater inequality can be conducive to 
more redistribution via income taxation, more protectionist policies in capital-abundant 
countries, and less protectionist policies in labour-abundant countries. The model can 
accommodate the predictions of recent empirical studies on the relationship between inequality, 
protectionism, and redistribution. 
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5.  Conclusion Non-Technical Summary 
The politico-economic analysis of the link between inequality and redistribution is well established in both 
the field of international trade and the field of public economics, but both literatures have so far developed 
quite separately from each other. Following the classic paper by Mayer (1984), trade economists have 
focused on tariffs as the main instrument to redistribute income between domestic citizens in the open 
economy. On the other hand, contributions in the field of public economics have focused on economies 
that are closed to international trade, and have employed income taxes as the preferred means to 
redistribute income. In this paper we develop a political economy model of redistribution in an open 
economy, in which both tariffs and income tax rates are determined by majority vote. We go on to argue 
that our novel approach is well suited to accommodate empirical evidence that has been influential in both 
the international trade and the public economics analysis of the inequality-redistribution link. 
 
We introduce a framework that allows for the joint determination of trade taxes and income taxes. In line 
with the existing literature on inequality and redistribution we identify income taxes as the key 
redistributive instrument, but acknowledge that trade taxes have an impact on the primary (pre-tax) 
distribution of income. The Meltzer-Richard framework (1981) is cast into a simple neoclassical two-
country trade model with two sectors, and labour and capital as the two sector-specific factors of 
production. Countries differ in their relative factor endowments, and in equilibrium the labour abundant 
country exports the labour intensive good. Countries also differ in the degree of domestic inequality, as 
measured by distribution of capital across individuals in each country. Policy spillovers arise since the 
relative world market price is jointly determined by the tariffs in both countries, and the relative world 
market price affects capital income in the two countries. 
 
A political equilibrium is defined as a situation in which each country chooses, given the trade policy 
adopted by the other country, its majority-preferred policy. Three main positive results emerge from the 
analysis of political equilibria. Under basic conditions — inequality in capital endowments and excess 
demands at a zero price are both relatively large — that receive strong empirical support, greater 
inequality has 
the following consequences: 
     (i)     Redistribution through income taxes declines. 
     (ii)    The capital-abundant country becomes more protectionist. 
     (iii)   The labour-abundant country becomes less protectionist. 
These results are in accordance with recent empirical studies on the relationship between inequality, 
protectionism, and redistribution. 
The impact of inequality on redistributive and trade policies hinges on the relative potency of two effects: a 
domestic-politics effect and an international-trade effect. The former corresponds to the direct impact of 
inequality on each country’s majority-preferred domestic policy. The latter describes how changes in 
inequality affect countries’ strategic behaviour in the international-trade game, and therefore the resulting 
equilibrium policies. Our analysis of political equilibria reveals that these two effect work in opposite 
directions: while domestic politics alone would yield counterfactual equilibrium predictions, strategic 
interdependencies through international trade reverse the latter to yield the above results. 
 1 Introduction
The politico-economic analysis of the link between inequality and redistribution is well-
established in both the ﬁeld of international trade and the ﬁeld of public economics, but
both literatures have so far developed quite separately from each other. Following the clas-
sic paper by Mayer (1984), trade economists have focused on tariﬀs as the main instrument
to redistribute income between domestic citizens in the open economy. On the other hand,
contributions in the ﬁeld of public economics have focused on economies that are closed to
international trade, and have employed income taxes as the preferred means to redistribute
income. In this paper we develop a political economy model of redistribution in an open
economy, in which both tariﬀs and income tax rates are determined by majority vote. We
go on to argue that our novel approach is well suited to accommodate empirical evidence
that has been inﬂuential in both the international trade and the public economics analysis
of the inequality-redistribution link.
Trade theory’s take on this question has typically come in the form of analysing the
relationship between inequality in factor endowments and the level of protection, with
Mayer (1984) being the ﬁrst to analyse the endogenous determination of tariﬀs in a direct
democracy. He ﬁnds that in a standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade model the trade policy bias
introduced by majority voting relative to the social optimum depends on the trade pattern
of the country: A less equal distribution of capital ownership biases import taxes towards
trade protection if the country imports the labour intensive good, while it biases the trade
policy towards trade promotion if the country imports the capital intensive good. The
intuition for this is simple: The median voter has less capital than the economy average,
and hence has an incentive to shift the income distribution in favour of labour. With tariﬀs
as the only policy instrument, this requires increasing the domestic relative price of the
labour intensive good, which is exactly what is achieved by the trade policies chosen by the
median voter in equilibrium. Dutt and Mitra (2002, 2006) subject the Mayer-Heckscher-
Ohlin model to empirical scrutiny, and ﬁnd support for the mechanism put forward in it.
In the same vein, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) ﬁnd that individual’s attitudes towards trade
vary with their level of human capital in a way predicted by the Mayer-Heckscher-Ohlin
1model.
The political-economy literature in public economics that discusses the relationship
between income inequality and redistribution dates back to the seminal work of Romer
(1975), Roberts (1977), and Meltzer and Richard (1981). The latter point to pre-tax in-
equality — the diﬀerence between mean and median incomes — as the major determinant
of income redistribution: greater inequality translates into a median voter who is poorer
relative to the mean income, and therefore raises the median voter’s support for redis-
tributive policies that reduce the gap between rich and poor. Though intuitively quite
amenable, this “Meltzer-Richard paradigm of redistribution” is inconsistent with empirical
evidence. Paraphrasing Bénabou (2000), “redistribution is often correlated with income
inequality in just the opposite way than predicted by standard politico-economic theory:
among industrial democracies the more unequal ones tend to redistribute less, not more.”
The political-economy literature has devoted much attention in recent years to this
puzzling observation. The explanations it provides fall into three broad classes. The
ﬁrst identiﬁes situations in which higher inequality increases the cost of redistributive
policies to the decisive voter (see for instance Saint-Paul, 2001). The second shows that,
when both redistributive and insurance motives inﬂuence voters’ preference for government
redistribution, political support for the latter may decrease with inequality (Bénabou, 2000,
and Moene and Wallerstein, 2001). The third puts emphasis on non-economic factors
that inﬂuence citizens’ preferences for income redistribution — like for instance social
competition in Corneo and Grüner (2000), or social perceptions regarding the fairness of
market outcomes in Alesina and Angeletos (2005).1 Our aim is to develop and explore
another and quite diﬀerent explanation, one that emphasizes the role of policy spillovers
between countries that are linked through international trade.
To this end, in this paper we introduce a framework that allows for the joint determina-
tion of trade taxes and income taxes. In line with the existing literature on inequality and
redistribution we identify income taxes as the key redistributive instrument, but acknowl-
1We also refer the reader to Corneo and Grüner (2002), and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for recent
empirical studies of the determinants of preferences for redistribution.
2edge that trade taxes have an impact on the primary (pre-tax) distribution of income. The
Meltzer-Richard framework is cast into a simple neoclassical two-country trade model with
two sectors, and labour and capital as the two sector-speciﬁc factors of production. Coun-
tries diﬀer in their relative factor endowments, and in equilibrium the labour abundant
country exports the labour intensive good. Countries also diﬀer in the degree of domestic
inequality, as measured by distribution of capital across individuals in each country. Pol-
icy spillovers arise since the relative world market price is jointly determined by the tariﬀs
in both countries, and the relative world market price aﬀects capital income in the two
countries.
In this economic environment, the collective-choice framework we use is as follows.
Each country is assumed to choose its policy vector with majority rule, which maps the
country’s capital endowment (or wealth) distribution into an aggregate preference relation
over the set of feasible policies. Since voters’ preferences over domestic policies depend
on the other country’s trade policy, this is used to deﬁne each country’s “best-response
function” in the international-trade game played by the two countries. In this paper, a
political equilibrium is therefore a situation in which each country chooses, given the trade
policy adopted by the other country, its majority-preferred policy.
Three main positive results emerge from the analysis of political equilibria. Under
basic conditions — inequality in capital endowments and excess demands at a zero price
are both relatively large — that receive strong empirical support, greater inequality has
the following consequences:
(i) Redistribution through income taxes declines.
(ii) The capital-abundant country becomes more protectionist.
(iii) The labour-abundant country becomes less protectionist.
Result (i) is in accordance with the evidence from the public economics literature cited
above, while results (ii) and (iii) are in accordance with the evidence from the trade
literature.
3The impact of inequality on redistributive and trade policies hinges on the relative
potency of two eﬀects: a domestic-politics eﬀect and an international-trade eﬀect. The
former corresponds to the impact of inequality on each country’s majority-preferred do-
mestic policy, holding the other country’s trade policy constant at its equilibrium level.
The latter describes how changes in inequality aﬀect countries’ strategic behavior in the
international-trade game, and therefore the resulting equilibrium policies. Our analysis of
political equilibria reveals that these two eﬀect work in opposite directions: while domestic
politics alone would yield counterfactual equilibrium predictions, strategic interdependen-
cies through international trade reverse the latter to yield the above results.
In his excellent survey of the literature on the political economy of trade policy Rodrik
(1995) emphasizes the challenge facing economic theorists to explain why trade policy is
chosen in equilibrium if other policies, which are more eﬃcient for redistributing income, are
available.2 There are only a few theoretical contributions along these lines, and all of those
achieve this by highlighting some form of asymmetry between tariﬀs and the alternative
instruments that may make tariﬀs an equilibrium choice despite their ineﬃciency.3 In the
present paper, this asymmetry is with respect to the ability of both instruments to aﬀect
relative prices, which in our setup exists for tariﬀs but not for the comprehensive income
tax. Hence in our two-country model there is an incentive for strategic use of tariﬀs that
does not exist for income taxes.
The paper is structured as follows. The model is described in Section 2. In Section 3,
we perform some comparative statics exercises on each country’s majority-winning policy.
Section 4 contains the main results of the paper, and Section 5 concludes.
2The point is nicely illustrated by the well-known remark: “Saying that trade policy exists because it
serves to transfer income to favored groups is a bit like saying Sir Edmund Hillary climbed Mt. Everest
because he wanted to get some mountain air" (Rodrik, 1995, p. 1470).
3In Mayer and Riezman (1989, 1990) voters are heterogeneous in dimensions other than factor endow-
ments, and the relevance of these heterogeneities for tariﬀs and income taxes, respectively, may lead to the
presence of tariﬀs in equilibrium. In the models by Rodrik (1986), Mitra (2000) and Glazer and Ranjan
(2007) tariﬀs may be chosen in equilibrium since their use goes hand in hand with a lower total volume of
redistribution, which in turn has a positive eﬀect on the total excess burden in the economy.
42 The Model
2.1 The Economic Environment
Consider a competitive world economy with two countries, indexed by i = A;B, each
populated by a mass-one continuum of individuals, who are all endowed with L units of
labour, but diﬀer in their capital endowment (wealth): An individual of “type” e living
in country i has a capital endowment  yi + e. The countries are identical in all respects,
except in the level and distribution of capital endowments. Let ei denote the median type
in country i, while the average type is normalized to zero in both countries. We assume
throughout that country A has a higher capital endowment:  yA >  yB.
Country i has two sectors, each producing a single consumption good. Sector 1 produces
a numeraire good from labour alone with a constant input-output coeﬃcient equal to
unity. The wage rate is therefore equal to one if sector 1 is active. Sector 2 produces a
nonnumeraire good from capital alone with a constant input-output coeﬃcient equal to
unity. The capital income for a type-e individual is consequently pi ( yi + e), where pi is
the price of good 2 in country i.
In both countries, an individual’s utility is given by u   V , where u represents the
utility from private consumption, and V represents the disutility from labour supply. The
function u is quasilinear in the consumption of the numeraire good, so that utility from
consumption of a type-e individual living in country i is of the form Ii
e+S (pi), where Ii
e —
which will be fully detailed below — is the individual’s income net of taxes and transfers,
and S(pi) is the individual’s consumer surplus. In order to ease explicit analysis, we follow
the previous literature – as Grossman and Helpman (2005), Laussel and Riezman (2005),
and Bond and Park (2002) for instance – and assume a linear demand function for the
non-numeraire good:  S0 (pi)  x(pi) =  pi, where  >  yA. Furthermore V is assumed
quadratic: the utility cost of providing ` units of labor is `2=2.
We assume that the income of all individuals is large enough for them to consume
strictly positive amounts of both goods. This implies, in combination with our above
assumption that countries have the same population size, that both will consume the same
5amount of good 2 in a free trade equilibrium. On the other hand, the supply of good 2 is
higher in capital abundant country A, which therefore exports good 2 under free trade.
Policy is chosen by majority rule in each country i. It has two components. First,
the government runs a redistributive policy by means of a linear income tax with tax rate
i accompanied by a lump sum transfer Ti  0, which is the same for all individuals in
country i. Thus, the disposable income of an individual of type e is
Ii
e = (1   i)[pi ( yi + e) + `(i)] + Ti; (1)
where `(i)  (1   i) = argmax`(1   i)`   `2=2 is individual labour supply, and it is
assumed that L is suﬃciently large as to be non-binding. Second, the government levies
a trade tax ti on good 2.4 Let p stand for the world price of good 2. We then have
p = pA + tA = pB   tB. We denote the net import volume of good 2 in country i by
mi(pi)  x(pi)    yi. The government budget constraint can then be written as
i [pi yi + `(i)]   (i)timi(pi) = Ti; (2)
with (i) being an indicator variable that equals 1 for i = A, and  1 for i = B. Henceforth,
we refer to a policy as a vector (i;ti), with Ti being determined as a residual.
Goods market equilibrium requires that export supply of good 2 by country A equals
import demand of good 2 by country B, at these countries’ respective domestic prices:
mA (pA) + mB (pB) = 0; (3)
where we know that pA = p   tA and pB = p + tB. Equation (3) implicitly deﬁnes the
world-market price function p (t), with t  (tA;tB). Simple calculations show that the
world market price and domestic prices are given by:
p(t) =
2 + tA   tB   ( yA +  yB)
2
pi(t) =
2   (i)(tA + tB)   ( yA +  yB)
2
(4)
It is easily checked that (i)@p=@ti > 0, and (i)@pi=@ti = (i)@pi=@tj < 0.
4We do not constrain ti to be positive. Our assumption that the numeraire is untaxed does not imply
a loss of generality, due to the Lerner Symmetry Theorem.










Figure 1: Free trade equilibrium
Crucially, eqs. (4) show that relative goods prices are independent of income tax rates
A and B. Figure 1 shows the reason for this, focusing for simplicity on the case of free
trade. Consider ﬁrst the case where both countries have the same income tax rate .
Country A produces at a and consumes at c, country B produces at b and consumes at d.
Relative price p adjusts to clear the world market for goods 1 and 2. Now, consider an
increase in the income tax rate in country A, from  to 0. Output and demand for good
1 in country A fall by the same amount (to b0 and d0, respectively), thereby leaving the
market clearing relative goods price unchanged.
We are now in a position to deﬁne individuals’ policy preferences. Combining equations
(1) and (2), we can write the policy preferences of an individual of type e living in country
i, given that trade tax tj is adopted by country j, as




  (i)timi (pi (t)) + S (pi (t)) . (5)
It is easily checked that the indirect utility function (5) is of the general form Ai(t;i) +
eBi(t;i), and hence it represents intermediate preferences as deﬁned by Grandmont
7(1978).5 With intermediate preferences, the existence of a median voter is ensured even in
the presence of a multidimensional policy space. The issue is explored further in Section 3
below.
Throughout the analysis, we will maintain the following assumption:
Assumption 1 For each i = A;B,  
p
3 < ei < 0.
The ﬁrst inequality ensures that vi (;;tj;ei) is strictly concave for any tj and ei. The
second inequality says, in accordance with empirical observation, that the average type is
wealthier than the the median type.
2.2 Collective Choice
Each country collectively chooses a domestic policy by majority rule taking the choice of
the other country as given. Thus, policies are chosen cooperatively within countries but
non-cooperatively across countries. Furthermore, equation (5) makes apparent that the
utility of a citizen of country i depends not only on the domestic policy (i;ti) but also on
the trade policy tj adopted by country j. It is independent on j since, as shown above, in
our setup changes in j have no eﬀect on the relative goods price. Citizens’ preferences over
domestic policies, and therefore the majority-preferred policy — or “Condorcet winner” —
in country i, will consequently be aﬀected by the policy choice of country j, thus generating
strategic interdependence among the countries. In such a context, the appropriate political
equilibrium concept to study is that of a group Nash equilibrium (Duggan, 2001), namely a
pair of country policies such that each country, given the other country’s policy, is choosing
a Condorcet winner.












B) is a Condorcet winner in country B given that country A’s export tax is t
A.
5For a textbook treatment of intermediate preferences, see Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 2.2.2).
8Put diﬀerently, a political equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game
in which players’ — or countries’ — best-response functions result from majority voting
over domestic policy vectors. Characterizing these best-response functions occupies the
section to follow.
3 Domestic Politics
We start the analysis by focusing on domestic politics, postponing the study of political
equilibria until the next section. That is, we ﬁrst study the determination of the Condorcet
winner in a given country, keeping ﬁxed the policies prevailing in the other country. This
characterization of countries’ “best-response functions” will prepare the ground for the more
complicated analysis of political equilibria.
Our analysis of Condorcet winners is divided into two subsections. We begin by ex-
plaining the main factors that determine Condorcet winners. Then, we establish useful
comparative-statics results on the eﬀects of changes in income inequality and foreign trade
policy.
3.1 Condorcet Winners
The ﬁrst issue is the existence of a Condorcet winner. A famed result of voting theory in-
deed states that Condorcet winners generically fail to exist in models with multidimensional
policy spaces. However, using Assumption 1 as well as the observation that individuals in
our model have intermediate preferences, represented by indirect utility function (5), we
immediately obtain the following: There exists a unique Condorcet winner in each country
i, i = A;B, which coincides with the ideal policy of the voter of type ei for any tj, j 6= i.
Of particular interest is this: Although foreign trade policies inﬂuence the preferred do-
mestic policy vector of the domestic median voter, they do not change his identity. That
is, the Condorcet winner is always the ideal policy of the median type ei. Our next step is




9Assuming interior solutions, the policy (i;ti) that maximizes the median voter’s utility in
each country must satisfy the following ﬁrst-order conditions:








+ (1   i)ei
@pi
@ti
= 0 i = A;B (8)
Eqs. (7) show that the utility maximising tax rate i in each country equalises the marginal
beneﬁt that the median voter gets from increased redistribution,  piei, to the marginal
welfare cost of increasing the tax rate,  i`0(i). With ei and `0 both negative, the optimal
tax rate must be strictly positive.
Similarly, eqs. (8) give the condition for the optimal trade tax in each country. The
ﬁrst two terms side are familiar from the standard optimum tariﬀ formula, as they give the
positive terms of trade gain for the country from increasing the trade tax (ﬁrst term) and
the negative tariﬀ revenue eﬀect from increasing the trade tax (second term), respectively.
The third term shows the pre-tax distribution eﬀect, known in principle from the Mayer
(1984) model: the welfare of a median voter with below-average capital endowment is
negatively aﬀected by an increase in the price for the capital intensive good, ceteris paribus.
Hence the pre-tax distribution eﬀect is positive for capital-abundant country A, where an
increase in the trade tax lowers the relative price of the capital intensive good, and negative
for capital-scarce country B, where the opposite is true. Eqs. (8) show that the existence
of a positive income tax i serves to mitigate the pre-tax distribution eﬀect, but that it
does not eliminate it. We therefore ﬁnd that the result pointed out by Dutt and Mitra
(2002) in the case of the Mayer model holds as well in our framework with a second policy
instrument: Political economy eﬀects bias the trade policy towards more protectionism
in capital abundant countries and towards less protectionism in capital-scarce countries,
ceteris paribus.
First-order conditions (7) and (8) give for each country i the constrained optimal tax
e i(ti;ei;tj) and the constrained optimal tariﬀ e ti(i;ei;tj), respectively. It is easily checked
that for country A both ﬁrst order conditions are downward sloping in i  ti space, while











Figure 2: Condorcet Winners
The slopes of the respective loci are explained as follows. In the case of the constrained
optimal income tax e i(ti;), both a decrease in the export tax tA or an increase in the
import tax tB increase the respective domestic relative price of the capital intensive good,
thereby increasing the marginal beneﬁt that the median voter gets from redistribution.
In order to restore the constrained optimum, the marginal welfare cost of the tax has
to increase, which is brought about by an increase in i, i = A;B. In the case of the
constrained optimal tariﬀ e ti(i;), increasing i reduces in absolute size the marginal eﬀect
that a tariﬀ change has on the median voter’s transfer income. In country A this marginal
eﬀect is positive, while it is negative in country B. The reduction of a positive marginal
eﬀect in country A requires that the net eﬀect of the tariﬀ on the terms of trade and
the goods market distortion becomes less negative. This is achieved by reducing tA. The
opposite adjustment is required in country B: The reduction of a negative marginal eﬀect
in absolute size requires that the net eﬀect of the tariﬀ on the terms of trade and the goods
market distortion becomes less positive. This in turn requires an increase in tB. Using our
parametrisations, explicit expressions for the constrained optimal taxes can be derived to
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2   ( yi +  yj)   (i)(ti + tj)

(10)
The graphical representations of ~ i(ti) and ~ ti(i) are given by the solid curves in ﬁgure 2,
where the relative slopes follow from assumption 1.
The intersection of the respective loci gives the Condorcet winners ^ i(ei;tj) and ^ ti(ei;tj)
for each country as a function of their respective median voter’s capital endowment and
the other country’s trade policy.
3.2 Comparative Statics
Before determining equilibrium policies in the open-economy, as an intermediate step we
examine how the national Condorcet winners are aﬀected by exogenous changes in tj and
ei, respectively. It is clear from the previous section that these eﬀects in turn are jointly
determined by the eﬀects that these changes have on constrained optimal trade and income
taxes, respectively.
The eﬀects of an exogenous change in foreign trade policy is summarised in the following
lemma:
Lemma 1. An increase in the trade tax tj leads to
(i) a reduction in the optimal income tax rate ^ i for the capital abundant country (i = A),
(ii) an increase in the optimal income tax rate ^ i for the labour abundant country (i = B),
(iii) an increase in the optimal tariﬀ ^ ti if and only if the median voter’s capital endowment
ei is below the threshold level e =  1.
Proof. See the appendix.
An intuitive understanding of the lemma can be gained with the help of eqs. (9) and
(10) as well as Figure 3. A change in foreign trade policy aﬀects national Condorcet















Figure 3: Domestic Politics Eﬀects of Increasing tj
the constrained optimal income tax. From (9), the constrained optimal tariﬀ ~ ti in both
countries decreases with an increase in the respective other country’s tariﬀ, and hence both
~ tA and ~ tB shift to the left. Furthermore, from (10), the constrained optimal income tax
e i decreases in country B but increases in country A. Lemma 1 shows that the resulting
eﬀect on ^ i is unambiguous, while the eﬀect on ^ ti depends on the relative endowment of
the median voter. With a poor median voter, characterised by capital endowment ei <  1,
^ ti is increasing in tj, and hence the tariﬀs in the two countries are strategic complements.
This is the case depicted in ﬁgure 3, and the one we will be focusing on below.
As a second comparative statics exercise, consider a rise in income inequality as mea-
sured by the distance between the average and median endowments,  ei. A decrease in ei
has the usual eﬀect of increasing the preferred income tax rate of the median voter, ceteris
paribus, as shown in eq. (10). This is reﬂected in ﬁgure 4 by an upward shift in both e A
and e B. Furthermore, with a poorer median voter (i.e. a lower value for ei) the absolute
size of the pre-tax distribution eﬀect increases. As a consequence the preferred tariﬀ of
the median voter increases in country A and decreases in country B (compare eq. (9)),















Figure 4: Domestic Politics Eﬀects of Decreasing ei
countries. In ﬁgure 4, e tA shifts to the right, while e tB shifts to the left. The eﬀect of the
decrease in ei on the Condorcet winner (^ ti; ^ i) in each country is unclear in general, and
it depends on the slopes of the constrained optimal policy loci, as well as on the extent to
which these loci shift as a consequence of the decrease in ei.
The case presented in ﬁgure 4, in which the optimal income tax rate in both countries
goes up, while the optimal tariﬀ decreases in country A and increases in country B is there-
fore just illustrative. It is however shown in Proposition 3 below that the case presented
here is indeed the outcome if (i) we start from a political equilibrium, as deﬁned above, and
(ii) the median voters of both countries are suﬃciently poor (relative to the mean-income
citizen). We consider this our benchmark scenario. In this scenario, more inequality leads
to more redistribution via the income tax system, while the redistribution of the pre-tax
income through tariﬀs is reduced. While plausible, this outcome is problematic in the face
of the empirical evidence cited above: The Meltzer-Richard paradigm for income tax rates
still holds in this scenario, while the eﬀect of inequality on tariﬀs is exactly opposite to
the standard result from the Mayer model, for which Dutt and Mitra (2002) ﬁnd empirical
support. We now turn to the strategic interaction between the policies in the two coun-
14tries, which was hitherto neglected. In particular, we are interested to see whether – and
under what conditions – the comparative static results for the full political equilibrium are
compatible with the empirical evidence on the relationship between income inequality and
equilibrium policy outcomes.
4 International Politics
We now turn to the analysis of the full equilibrium of our model. Section 4.1 starts with an
intuitive account of how the domestic politics (DP) comparative static eﬀects are related
to the international politics (IP) eﬀects, where the latter take into account the strategic
interdependency between the trade policies of the two countries. A formal analysis follows
in section 4.2.
4.1 General Intuitions
We begin the analysis of political equilibria with an intuitive presentation of some key
mechanisms. By deﬁnition, a political equilibrium f(
i (ei;ej);t
i (ei;ej))gi=A;B must sat-
isfy the following conditions:














for every i = A;B, j 6= i. The above identities allow us to relate the domestic politics
eﬀect of a change in inequality on income tax rate and tariﬀ rate to the overall change in
these variables in the political equilibrium.














We can substitute for @t
j=@ei by diﬀerentiating (12) with respect to ej and exchanging

















as the international trade multiplier, linking the domestic and international politics eﬀects
of a change in the income of the median voter. Since we consider the case where tariﬀs are
strategic complements,  is either positive and greater than one or negative, implying that
the domestic politics eﬀect @^ ti=@ei is either augmented or reversed in the full equilibrium.
To gain a better understanding of the mechanisms at play, consider the example de-
scribed by Figure 5. The two thick lines ^ tA and ^ tB depict the Condorcet winners in the
two countries as a function of the respective other country’s tariﬀ. As drawn, ^ tB cuts ^ tA
from below, and it is easily checked that this is the case if and only if  is negative.6 This
result is assured if the median voter in both countries is suﬃciently poor. By deﬁnition,
the intersection of the two loci determines the equilibrium trade policy vector (t
A;t
B).
Assume now that the endowment level eA decreases, and consider the benchmark scenario
from section 3.2, i.e. the case where ^ tA is increasing in the median voter’s endowment
everywhere. The ^ tA locus shifts to the left, and its new position is represented by the thin
line in Figure 5. The arrows show the changes in the equilibrium tariﬀs, and one can see
that both tariﬀs are higher in the new equilibrium.
Thus, this example describes a situation in which the strategic interdependencies gen-
erated by international trade reverse the eﬀect of inequality in country A on its own tariﬀ
rate. This is brought about by the increase in country B’s tariﬀ, which can formally be














The eﬀect of a change on the median voter’s income on the income tax rate in the



















6Formally, we have 0 < (@^ tA=@tB)











Figure 5: International Politics Eﬀect of Decreasing eA
where (15) has been used to substitute for @t
j=@ei. As the IP tariﬀ rate, the IP tax rate
depends on ei both directly and via the tariﬀ rate of the other country. A marginal change
in ei has therefore a direct eﬀect on the equilibrium tax rate, which is represented by the
ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of the above equation. But a marginal change in ei has also
an indirect eﬀect on ^ i, for it aﬀects ^ ti(;ei), namely the best-response function of country
i’s government (or median voter) in the tariﬀ game played by both countries’ governments.
This then results in a change in the equilibrium value of tj, which in turn aﬀects country i’s
equilibrium tax rate. The second term in (16) represents this “international-trade eﬀect.”
It is easily checked that in the case where the international trade multiplier  is negative
the international trade eﬀect on the tax rate in both countries works against the direct
domestic politics eﬀect identiﬁed in the previous section.
To be sure, this is just an illustration at this stage of how the presence of strategic
policy interaction between the two countries may have the potential to reverse the domestic
politics eﬀect on the tax rate, and bring the overall eﬀect in accordance with the stylised
facts. Next we turn to a formal analysis of this issue, which will allow us to actually sign
the eﬀects of a change in ei on the policy variables.
174.2 Formal Analysis
In order to derive our results formally, we need to make the assumption that at a zero price
for the capital intensive good the import demand for it would be large in both countries:
Assumption 2 For each i = A;B, mi(0) >
p
3=2.
Using this assumption, the following establishes the main results of the paper:
Proposition 1. Let f(
i ();t
i())gi=A;B be a political equilibrium. Then, a decrease in ei
leads to
(i) a reduction in the equilibrium income tax rate 
i ,
(ii) an increase in the equilibrium tariﬀ t
i for i = A,
(iii) a reduction in the equilibrium tariﬀ t
i for i = B,
whenever ej is below some threshold ~ ej >  
p
3.
Proof. See the appendix.
An immediate implication of Proposition 1 is the following: If inequality is suﬃciently
large in both trading economies, a further increase in inequality reduces domestic redistri-
bution through income taxes. Furthermore, the increase in inequality makes the capital
abundant country more protectionist and the labour abundant country less protectionist.
Part (i) of the proposition stands in sharp contrast to the Meltzer-Richard paradigm
of redistribution, according to which greater inequality is unambiguously correlated with a
higher income tax. Meltzer and Richard (1981) consider a closed economy in which citizens
vote over a single policy dimension. Our model shows that, when there are international
policy spillovers and citizens vote over both domestic redistribution and international trade
policies, income taxation may fall as inequality rises. In the extended model we thus obtain
a theoretical prediction that corresponds better to the empirical evidence mentioned in the
introduction. Parts (ii) and (iii) in principle do replicate the result from the standard Mayer
(1984) model, which has been put forward by Dutt and Mitra (2002). The mechanism by
18which this result comes about is very diﬀerent to the Mayer model, however. In particular,
with the income tax as a second instrument at the disposal of the median voter in our setup,
strategic interaction between the two countries’ median voters is essential to replicate the
Mayer result.
The role of strategic interaction is conﬁrmed by looking at the eﬀect that increased
inequality in one country has on the equilibrium tariﬀ chosen by the trading partner:
Proposition 2. A decrease in ei leads to
(i) an increase in the equilibrium tariﬀ t
j for i = A,
(ii) a reduction in the equilibrium tariﬀ t
j for i = B,
whenever ej is below some threshold ^ ej >  
p
3.
Proof. See the appendix.
Propositions 1 and 2 together show that for a suﬃciently high level of initial inequality
equilibrium tariﬀs in both countries change in the same direction if inequality in one of
the countries grows further. A graphical illustration of this case is given by the example
in Subsection 4.1 above.
One more way of showing the importance of strategic trade policy setting is to look at
the counterfactual: Suppose we start out in a political equilibrium and analyse the eﬀect
of increased domestic inequality for a given value of the other country’s tariﬀ. Formally,
this means looking at how the Condorcet winners ^ i(tj;ei) and ^ ti(tj;ei) change with a
decrease in ei, while holding tj constant at its pre-change equilibrium level. We can show
the following:
Proposition 3. Suppose we start oﬀ in a political equilibrium f(
i ();t
i())gi=A;B. Then,
a decrease in ei leads to
(i) an increase in the Condorcet income tax rate ^ i,
(ii) a decrease in the Condorcet tariﬀ ^ ti for i = A,
19(iii) an increase in the Condorcet tariﬀ ^ ti for i = B,
whenever the maximum of ei and ej is below some threshold ^ e >  
p
3.
Proof. See the appendix.
Hence, were there no strategic interaction between countries trade policy choices, in the
case of a poor median voter considered throughout our model would generate predictions
for the income tax rate similar to those in Meltzer and Richard (1981). Put diﬀerently, the
addition of the trade policy dimension to their original model is not suﬃcient to reverse
their counterfactual conclusions about the relationship between inequality and income
taxation. On the other hand, looking at Proposition 3 through the lens of the Mayer
(1984) model, the addition of a second instrument as such does reverse the prediction of
the model emphasized by Dutt and Mitra (2002): a poorer median voter now chooses
less redistribution through tariﬀs. The strategic interdependency of both countries’ trade
policies is therefore decisive in bringing about our key result in Proposition 1 that is
compatible with the evidence on inequality, redistribution, and protection.
5 Conclusion
The relationship between inequality, protectionism, and income redistribution is a complex
one. In this paper, we develop a model that starts from the primitive of countries’ income
distributions and builds up a structure tractable enough to capture the predictions of recent
empirical exercises on this relationship. Our analysis rests on two premises: (i) income
and trade taxes are both redistributive instruments that interact with each other, and (ii)
international trade generates international policy spillovers. We construct a framework that
incorporates these two ingredients, and study the eﬀect of income inequality on aggregate
political outcomes in this context. Consistent with empirical evidence, the main predictions
of the model are that greater inequality is conducive to more redistribution via income
taxation, more protectionist policies in capital-abundant countries, and less protectionist
policies in labour-abundant countries. These results are established under the condition
that inequality is relatively important in each country. There is now an abundant literature
20showing that inequality measures vary greatly across time and place. While there is no
consensus on how to measure inequality (see Cowell, 2000), all indicators display signiﬁcant
levels of inequality in both developing and developed countries.7
The impact of inequality on redistribution and protectionism has already received much
attention in the previous literature. But the principal contribution of the present paper
is to throw light on new channels through which income inequality impacts countries’
redistributive and trade policies: two-dimensional majority voting at the domestic level
on the one hand, and strategic interdependencies between countries’ trade policies on the
other hand. The analysis shows how these domestic-politics and international-trade eﬀects
interact to yield the above-mentioned predictions.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1




is implicitly deﬁned by the system of equations (7) and
(8). Solving this system of equations and rearranging terms yields:
^ i (tj;ei) =













A brief inspection of equation (17) above reveals that
@^ i(tj;ei)







By Assumption 1, ei < 0 and 3   e2
i > 0. This proves parts (i) and (ii) of the lemma.










i < 3, the above derivative is nonnegative if and only if ei   1.
7Income inequality measures for a large number of countries can be found in United Nations (2007, pp.
281-284).
21Proof of Proposition 1
By deﬁnition, f(
i (ei;ej);t
i (ei;ej))gi=A;B solves the system of ﬁrst-order conditions (7)
and (8) for both countries simultaneously. Tedious computations reveal that the unique
solution of this system of four equations and four unknowns is















































for each i = A;B.



































i is increasing in ei if and only if















Denote by f(ej) and g(ej;ei) the left- and right-hand sides of the above inequality, respec-





f(ej) = 2mj(0)  
p
3 > 0 = sup
ej;ei
g(ej;ei) ,














. This proves part (i).
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@ei < 0 if and only if
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j + ei (ei   2ej)
2ei
. (23)
Let l(ej) and h(ej;ei) stand for the left- and right-hand sides of the above inequality,













































By continuity, this in turn implies that there exists a suﬃciently small " such that l(ej) >
supei2( 
p








. Setting ~ e2
j = " 
p
3, we thus obtain
inequality (23) for all ej  ~ e2
j.







Proof of Proposition 2
The t
j function is obtained by substituting j to i and i to j in (21). Then, diﬀerentiating
























23Suppose ej <  1. Hence, (i)
@t
j
@ei  0 if and only if
 ei






  2( yi    yj)

 4   e2
j:
Assumption 2 – namely mj(0) >
p
3=2 – guarantees that the above condition holds






if ej !  
p
3. By continuity, therefore, there
exists a suﬃciently small  <
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Setting ^ ej    
p
3, we obtain the proposition.
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3). We know from Proposition 2 that (i)t
j (ej;ei)






. This implies that i is a decreasing func-











. This proves the ﬁrst part of the proposition.


















From Proposition 1, (i)
@t
i (ei;ej)
@ei whenever ej < ~ ej. Moreover, inspection of (19) reveals
that, for each i and j with i 6= j,
@^ ti(t
j;ei)










j( ej; ei); ei)
> 0






, where  e  min





. Thus, setting ^ e  minf^ eA; ^ eB;  eg
completes the proof of Proposition 3.
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